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Insurgency and irregular war continue to be a prevalent phenomenon in the international 
system.  Fighting irregular wars challenge military doctrine used by established militaries 
across the developed world.  These militaries invariably end up combating insurgencies 
through train and equip missions, although the adoption of train and equip usually 
happens after the insurgency has become well established.  This thesis examines and 
analyzes approaches taken by the organized militaries from Afghanistan, Turkey, and 
Columbia in fighting their insurgencies, and the role that the train-and-equip mission 
played in preparing their respective militaries for their mission. To support the research, 
each case study is built upon an analysis of the history of each insurgency and the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) response from the state and military forces. How did the 
countries train and equip their forces to battle the insurgency? What findings and policy 
implications can be derived from examining these different COIN case studies? 
This thesis finds that the training and equipping mission should be a top priority 
for all nations fighting an insurgency. In addition, the successes and failures from the 
three case studies examined show that regardless of the cause of the insurgency, once the 
insurgency is in full swing, one of the key elements to defeat the insurgency is with a 
properly trained self-sustaining force. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines and analyzes the steps taken by the militaries of 
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Columbia in combating the insurgencies inside their borders.  
In particular, the thesis examines how they trained and equipped their armed forces to 
meet the challenge of insurgency. It also uses these cases to gain generalizable insights 
on the role that different approaches to train and equip played for the conventional 
militaries of these three states 
B. BACKGROUND 
Effectively countering an insurgency is a daunting task.  Counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations have proven to be one of the most challenging assignments a military 
can confront, and can be even more demanding for a government and people who find 
themselves involved in the difficult circumstances surrounding an insurgency. A typical 
national response includes increased allocations to the military and new laws and state 
policies; but unintended consequences arise when external support (or opposition) is 
introduced into a country’s internal disputes, and the conflict usually becomes more 
intense. Insurgencies are unpredictable and defy formula—they differ from state to state, 
over time, and even within the same country. One problem in COIN doctrine is the 
typical longevity of the conflict; a study of ninety countries that have experienced 
insurgency after 1945 showed an average duration of fourteen years.1 As this data 
suggests, insurgencies are extremely difficult to eradicate, regardless of geographic 
location. 
War and irregular combat in particular continue to vex military strategists, such as 
those who predicted easy victories in Iraq and Afghanistan for U.S. forces. It was 
assumed that a powerful, better-equipped military would draw upon advanced technology 
supported by a surfeit of funding to easily defeat insurgencies—but such was not the 
                                                 
1 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense 
Research Institute, 2008), 11. 
 2 
case.2 As described by Robert Taber, the insurgent or guerilla fighter, uses the populace 
as his “efficient all-seeing” supply and intelligence cache to make up for lack of 
technology on the battlefield.3 With this advantage, the insurgent may frustrate and 
neutralize military opposition, as history has proven time and again. 
How long an insurgency endures may depend partly on the cultural and political 
context of the struggle and whether the insurgency is fueled from internal strife or from 
an outside invader, which was one of the main reasons the author chose three very 
different insurgencies to examine and research. Regardless of these circumstances, 
contemporary COIN theory holds that kinetic operations should not be a military’s main 
goal. Notwithstanding, as Colin Kahl states, concerning U.S. involvement at the 
beginning of recent COIN operations, “the Army and the Marine Corps had not 
substantially updated their counterinsurgency doctrine since the 1980s, choosing, in the 
wake of the Vietnam War, to forget counterinsurgency and focus instead on preparing for 
World War III.”4 Outdated core doctrines focused heavily on kinetic operations—though 
killing every insurgent is an impossible task. According to the author, the focal objective 
in contemporary doctrine should be to win the populace and train and equip host/local 
forces to carry out day-to-day missions such as policing, which helps resolve civil and 
ethnic disputes.  
From a national-security perspective, it is crucial for any nation faced with 
insurgency to establish objectives and strategies that align with needs—needs defined in 
the actual process of training and equipping forces against a foe that disregards sovereign 
borders and acts across international time zones, through influence or actual violence. 
In examining three insurgencies with different origins in disparate world 
locations, this thesis provides a detailed assessment that ignores the geographical or 
cultural focuses that can at times hinder COIN research. Afghanistan is a South Asian 
                                                 
2 H. R. McMaster, “The Pipe Dream of Easy War,” New York Times, July 20, 2013. 
3 Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice (New York: 
Citadel Press, 1970), 22–23. 
4 Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency?” Foreign Affairs 86, 
no.6 (November–December, 2007), 169. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032516. 
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country with an embedded insurgency fueled by strong internal and external factors; 
Turkey, a Middle Eastern country, faces an insurgency borne of ethnic and social 
collisions; and Columbia, an Andean country, deals with insurgent reaction to the “haves 
and have-nots” of society, coupled with a major narcotics fray. Analysis of these case 
studies helps explain how and why insurgencies escalate and highlights similarities that 
might lead to sound policies and disarm future conflicts. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
A central problem in battling any insurgency is how to do so without angering the 
population. There is extensive literature on how to fight insurgencies and minimize 
civilian casualties, but it has proven difficult for states to successfully operationalize and 
put theories into practice. The question of what constitutes a victory remains open. An 
insurgency may have been extinguished; but was the victory outweighed by too great a 
loss of blood and treasure? What happens when an insurgency is defeated—and how does 
it stay defeated? Investigating these questions will show the importance of building a 
force that can simultaneously defeat an insurgency and instill confidence among the 
people. 
The dilemmas researched in this thesis center around the need to empower civil 
institutions to win trust and confidence, with trust efforts focused on the people’s well-
being, and confidence focused on providing security.5 A nation needs a trustworthy 
police presence to enforce the law and provide justice and stability, in contrast to the 
easily broken promises that insurgents may make. This analysis is structured to examine 
why different nations, irrespective of culture and reasons for insurgency, encounter 
intractable and multifaceted problems in training and equipping their forces for the 
complex mission of defeating an insurgency. Though the literature discusses specific 
COIN issues and concerns, in general, there is insufficient emphasis on the importance of 
doctrine, training and equipping a mission, and little insight as to how to measure mission 
effectiveness. Some problems of state policies and procedures stem from: 1) a focus on 
                                                 
5 David Petraeus and James Amos, Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 191. 
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killing insurgents as a metric; 2) as insurgency increases, lack of a mutual response in 
military force as a counter; 3) inadequate increase in monetary funds needed to improve 
insurgency situations; and 4) subjective measures of success, making it challenging to 
determine what really works at what phase during an insurgency.6 Another problem is 
that many nations are unprepared when an insurgency arrives. 
It is obviously much easier to develop effective theories and practices in 
hindsight, but how many more COIN case studies are needed to provide data and policy 
ideas to implement before a COIN mission begins? There cannot be a perfect tool to 
measure and warn of an upcoming insurgency or to highlight what measures should be 
used to improve counter-insurgency efforts, but some valuable, successful strategies have 
been implemented by nations. Political factors and real strategic goals must be examined 
before how a nation’s reaction to insurgency can be truly criticized. 
This thesis examines three hypotheses to examine how a focus on train-and-
equip missions might affect the outcome of an insurgency, and to some extent, 
possibly prevent it. 
1. Hypothesis 1 
Regardless of culture or geography, nations typically do not focus on train-and-
equip policies to fight insurgencies; instead, the military focuses on large conventional 
military forces with monetary backing to defeat the insurgency. In this scenario, the 
insurgency continues to escalate and get out of control even with increased kinetic 
operations coupled with heavy military assets. 
2. Hypothesis 2 
The intensity of an insurgency depends on what cultural differences sparked the 
fight or whether the host nation has outside forces supporting COIN efforts, or both. This 
situation is similar to the current conflict in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
6 Historical trends that the author will examine for all three case studies. 
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3. Hypothesis 3 
When a COIN mission focuses on the processes to train and equip, especially in 
the training mission, whether by accident or plan, the insurgency decreases—irrespective 
of large monetary increases to forces. This scenario is categorized by an improvement in 
local forces’ ability to defeat insurgents, with the support of the populace. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the main focus of this study is to discover similarities and differences 
among Afghanistan, Turkey, and Columbia regarding their methods in training and 
equipping to fight an insurgency, there is a need to analyze past and present COIN 
literature and, in particular, to explore why militaries have such a difficult time with 
COIN missions. The literature considered for this analysis tackles these intricate 
questions by taking on three approaches: examination of insurgents, COIN case studies, 
and military actions and studies. This thesis, with its case studies of how three completely 
different insurgencies focused on, or neglected to focus on, train-and-equip policies—and 
the importance of such a focus for COIN mission success—fills a gap in the literature. 
1. Literature on Insurgents 
There is substantial literature on COIN efforts and tactics, but not a large selection 
focusing on insurgents. Understanding what insurgents want, how they operate, and 
possibly identifying their weaknesses is an emphasis much needed. A classic work worth 
reexamining is Robert Taber’s The War of the Flea. Truly understanding what an 
insurgent wants is a complicated task and hard to determine, since many variables, 
operating in different circumstances, result in diverse demands. Taber acknowledges this 
difficulty by examining revolutionary circumstances in Vietnam, Cuba, Iran, and 
Venezuela, exploring what a guerilla is and wants. Tabor argues, “When we speak of the 
guerilla fighter we are speaking of the political partisan, an armed civilian whose 
principal weapon is not his rifle or machete but his relationship to the community, the 
nation, in and for which he fights.”7 Guerilla groups are political entities that want some 
                                                 
7 Taber, War of the Flea, 21. 
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sort of change. Tabor points out that when COIN forces train to fight an insurgency, they 
may be perceived as a counter-revolutionary force that cannot match the momentum of 
the insurgents.8 While most COIN forces think they are fighting specific targets, in 
reality they may be fighting a movement that might have more support from the populace 
than presumed. 
Mao Tse-tung’s Guerilla Warfare is another important work that explains what 
insurgents/guerillas want, one that influenced much of Taber’s writings. An element that 
most COIN doctrine and tactics miss is the importance of propaganda. As much as the 
insurgents want to kill and disrupt government and allied forces, they spend much more 
time on propaganda and efforts to “explain, persuade, discuss, and convince.”9 This goal 
is expressed graphically in the organizational chart developed by Chairman Mao, in 
which the propaganda officer is subordinate only to the battalion commander and has as 
much responsibility as the executive officer.10 Yet there have been few or no COIN 
attempts to neutralize or match this thrust. 
Another false assumption made by militaries conducing COIN operations is that 
insurgents are weak because they lack strength in equipment, funding, and technology. 
Taber counters that belief by noting, 
For while the Army suffers from an embarrassment of wealth, and 
especially of expensive military hardware for which there is no 
employment, the guerilla has the freedom of his poverty. He owns nothing 
but his rifle and the shirt on his back, has nothing to defend but his 
existence.11 
The perceived weakness is actually the insurgent’s strength; they do not have land 
to defend in the military sense; they can move easily across terrain; and they do not 
require much capital, whether human or financial. By contrast, for the U.S. and most 
militaries, the money and logistics needed to run a military operation is expensive and 
                                                 
8 Taber, War of the Flea, 21. 
9 Tse-tung Mao, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18: Mao Tse-tung on 
Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 
1989), 13. 
10 Ibid., 124. 
11 Ibid., 22. 
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can be ineffective, because technology cannot separate the insurgents from the 
population. The War of the Flea and Guerilla Warfare provide realistic explanations of 
who insurgents are and why militaries across the world should reexamine their policies 
towards insurgents. These insights apply to the insurgencies in the cases considered here. 
2. COIN Case Studies 
It is important to examine this research under the lens of past and present 
literature. The primary questions are, first, what happened, and second, how do 
differences and similarities among the studies apply to current COIN objectives? 
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies 
examines thirty insurgency cases studies (including some in Afghanistan and Turkey), 
chosen according to the following criteria: 
 The cases were not coups. 
 They involved over 1000 deaths. 
 Implicated violence was driven by an armed uprising to change the 
government or take over a geographical area.12 
While insurgencies come in all different sizes, flavors, and reasons, this thesis 
focuses on train-and-equip policies that create and maintain a sustainable force for the 
future. This type of analysis helps build a case by identifying what cases were considered 
a COIN win or loss. To determine these outcomes, Christopher Paul and others examined 
the cases under the following logic: 1) if the government stays in power without major 
concessions to the insurgency, it is a COIN win or mixed win; 2) if the government had 
to compromise government rule or lose territory or governance ability due to insurgent 
demands, it is considered a COIN loss.13 
                                                 
12 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed 
Counterinsurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010), 
xi, xii. 
13 Ibid., xiv, xv. 
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Each case study presents a brief summary, and a discussion of what phases and 
factors shaped the outcome of the conflict, and explanations and analyses.14 It is 
important not to get overwhelmed in the details of lessons learned, because insurgencies 
are so dynamic and differ from region to region.15 This caveat is one of the main reasons 
the author chose to study three very different insurgencies. 
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare contains thirteen COIN studies, ranging 
from the Philippines in the early 20
th
 century to current missions in Columbia and 
Afghanistan. The work contains detailed descriptions, but not a single focal point on 
reasons, or data-highlighting explanations, or methods that worked. Rather, it shows 
various reasons and ups and downs that nations faced and provides a great starting point 
for policy implications and strategies.16 
Examining the past, especially the hodgepodge nature of insurgencies, with their 
similarities and differences, can help illuminate Afghanistan, Turkey, and Columbia’s 
insurgencies. 
3. Military Actions and Studies 
Understanding what the militaries did in a case study is vital to building a 
framework for understanding what worked, and why; perhaps even more important is 
scholarly critique and explanation of why the players acted as they did. 
What makes it so difficult for military forces to defeat an insurgency? Maiah 
Jaskoski’s Military Politics & Democracy in the Andes studies military actions in the 
Andes, especially Peru and Ecuador, and observes that soldiers may not want to engage 
in COIN operations because of restrictions and constraints or “mission overload.”17 
Could this be a trend in other countries? In her case studies, Jaskoski argues that 
Columbia’s military did engage in COIN operations, but tackled the tough policing 
                                                 
14 Ibid., xv, xvi. 
15 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, xvii. 
16 Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: 
Osprey, 2008), 18. 
17 Maiah Jaskoski, Military Politics & Democracy in the Andes (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2013), 21. 
 9 
mission only when it knew that funding from the U.S. would follow.18 This offers some 
interesting possibilities for understanding how countries train and equip. There is without 
question a need for monetary incentives to actually accomplish the equipping part—but 
the tougher part is the training mission once finances are in order and if an increase in 
funding changes the insurgency. 
Thomas Marks’s Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency details the 
adaptation that the Columbian Army developed to battle the FARC.19 The issues for the 
military included unexpected insurgent surges, lack of a professionally trained police 
force, and outdated American tactics that focused on conventional war strategies.20 
Peeling the onion of Columbia’s insurgency, a few related issues are revealed: problems 
in military adaptation, policing (which, if not done by separate forces, should be 
undertaken by the Army), and the tendency for old strategies and plans to hinder success. 
In a related theme, James Russell’s Innovation, Transformation, and War asserts 
that new doctrine may not be the only reason for success. He argues that innovation from 
units on the ground can lead to improved and/or successful COIN operations, as opposed 
to higher authorities dictating new doctrines.21 This logic is applied in particular to COIN 
operations in Iraq from 2005–2007, but Russell gives much insight into the possibility 
that other COIN cases could have the same results—that it was not the state or 
government that effected changes, but rather, forces on the ground, in real-time. 
These works provide the foundation needed to examine why nations carry out 
COIN missions as they do, and in particular, provide salient questions and methods for 
carrying out research. Among these questions are, 
 What were the insurgent’s goals? 
 Did the COIN mission end in victory? 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 185–186. 
19 Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 5. 
20 Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation, 9–10. 
21 James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar 
and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 3. 
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 Was the army overloaded, with too many restraints to conduct operations? 
 Did monetary funding improve COIN operations? 
 Did adaptation and innovation play a role? 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Examination of the research question in this thesis is conducted according to the 
comparative case-study method, by analyzing COIN objectives and strategies used in 
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Columbia. Similarities and differences as they relate to 
insurgency decrease are investigated, and policy implications for future COIN operations 
are drawn. Of particular interest is whether the U.S. has learned and applied lessons from 
the past to current objectives. Austin Long offers an intriguing statement concerning 
lessons learned on COIN missions: “Preparing for the challenge of COIN can no longer 
be allowed to wax and wane as it did during the Cold War. Instead, the United States 
must seriously study what lessons can be gleaned from the study of COIN.”22 There is no 
doubt that information and data are readily available for study by academics. The past 
twelve-plus years of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided valuable 
information and real-world testimonies on what really happened, and examining the 
processes used to defeat or reverse insurgency in three major cases usefully highlights the 
importance of train-and-equip missions. 
The ultimate goal of these case studies is to produce a claim or principle regarding 
COIN train-and-equip missions, to inform future policy. Using an inductive approach 
with comparisons, it is hoped that a more balanced and broader look will reveal important 
information. David Collier observes that a few case studies can “address important 
substantive questions,” and the comparison technique applied in the small number of 
cases can yield superior fundamental analyses.23 The challenge is to find the linkage 
                                                 
22 Austin Long, On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2006), 73. 
23 David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. 
Ada W. Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1993), 117. 
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between the different techniques used, after which a more “contextualized analysis”, may 
be discovered.24 
Sources used for this thesis include scholarly and newspaper articles, government 
documents, case studies, and books on insurgency issues in Afghanistan, Turkey, and 
Columbia. The goal is to analyze the previously stated hypotheses and explore the 
similarities and differences in the case studies. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I introduces the central research question and related methodology and 
the layout for this thesis. This chapter details the goal of the investigation, with a 
literature review of past and present COIN theories—especially literature that examines 
why and how insurgencies have been fought throughout history. 
Chapter II examines the social terrain of Afghanistan and the Soviet and Taliban 
years, 1979–2001. This chapter also takes an in-depth look at a training mission 
conducted by the author during a 2012 deployment in Helmand Province. This case study 
reveals the importance of training and equipping in a hostile environment and provides 
some unfiltered lessons that explain how tough the train-and-equip mission can truly be. 
Chapter III probes Turkey’s difficult fight with the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan 
(PKK), better known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The chapter starts with the history 
and causes leading up to the insurgency of the PKK and stresses the internal social and 
ethnic disturbances related to insurgencies—and how Turkey was able to weather the 
storm. 
Chapter IV examines Columbia’s multifaceted battle with the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionaries de Colombia (FARC). Like the other two studies, it begins with an 
examination and brief history. This case study emphasizes how Columbia fought the 
FARC and dealt with the complexity of haves and have-nots. 
Chapter V concludes the inductive research, analyzing findings from the case 
studies. Key points from each chapter are connected to show how important the train-
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
 12 
and-equip part of COIN operations is in counterinsurgency. The thesis ends with policy 




Afghanistan’s history is characterized by many occupations by foreign invaders, 
vast cultural differences across the country, and numerous insurgencies. Fighting 
insurgencies in Afghanistan challenged such diverse actors across history as Alexander 
the Great, the British, the Soviets, and the United States. By exploring Afghanistan’s 
dynamic ethnic composition, insurgent battles with the Soviet Union and Taliban, and a 
training mission conducted by the author during a deployment in 2012, possible 
indicators and future train-and-equip best practices are revealed that show the importance 
of training and equipping in a hostile environment. 
A. THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan is a very dynamic country, with multifaceted social and ethnic 
differences that make each area and region of territory distinct. Many of these groups are 
given almost complete autonomy by the government. That is not to say that the citizens 
of Afghanistan do not identify as Afghans, but to lump the different ethnic groups into 
one collection would be a grave mistake. The sense of belonging and characteristic traits 
of Afghan tribes center on local and tribal strengths. According to the author, who 
worked with thousands of Afghans, the assumption that the average Afghan cares most 
deeply about his village and family first was confirmed. The Qawm, or kinship, is their 
center of gravity, because family, village, and cultural dictate everyday decisions and 
explain how most Afghans act toward each other.25 The key takeaway is that Afghans 
care most about local entities and have a difficult time understanding and practicing 
nationalistic methods. Abdul Wali Khan famously stated, “I have been a Pakistani for 
thirty years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun for five thousand 
years.”26 Unlike Turkey and Colombia, in Afghanistan, culture and ethnic composition is 
critically important and must be understood before diving into current objectives. All 
                                                 
25 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 18. 
26 Ibid., 20. 
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nations have ethnic factors, but Afghanistan is exceptional, and much study is needed to 
understand Afghan social dynamics. 
Afghanistan contains many large and small ethnic groups, but because they are 
spread throughout the country, it is difficult to get an accurate number of current and past 
population figures. Many Afghans have traveled outside tribal borders, causing waves of 
population to ebb and flood, undermining accurate census counts.27 The largest ethnic 
group in Afghanistan is the Pashtuns. Making up approximately 40 percent of the 
population, they have many lineages that “unite larger clans” into a vast parentage group 
comprising mostly farmers and rural dwellers. These Afghans speak Pashtu and follow a 
strict code of Pashtunwali, which governs their everyday way of living and guides their 
actions.28 Another major ethnic group is the Tajiks, who constitute 30 percent of 
Afghanistan’s total population and mostly speak a Persian dialect. Located in rural 
villages, working as farmers, or in major cities, employed as merchants, they are slightly 
better educated than the Pashtuns.29 Next in numbers are the Hazaras, making up fifteen 
percent of the population and living mostly in the mountainous Hindu Kush region. The 
Hazaras are Shia Muslim descendants of the Mongol armies and work the land, trading 
and breeding livestock. They speak a dialect of Persian.30 The remaining large ethnic 
groups are the Uzbeks and Turkmen, who make up around ten percent of the population 
and are “Sunni Turkish-speaking groups that descend from nomadic tribal 
confederations.”31 There are many other small groups, such as the Aimaqs, Pashai, 
Baluch, and Arabs.32 There is not enough time or space in this research to explore 
Afghanistan’s vast ethnic groups in detail, but to point to the county’s difficult social 
terrain is the key take away. 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 23. 
28 Ibid., 24–25. 
29 Ibid., 26. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Barfield, Afghanistan, 27. 
32 Ibid., 27–29. 
 15 
Bernt Glatzer argues that tribal systems are politically important. Observing that 
the tribes make up about two thirds of the population, Glatzer asserts: 
Although the tribal principle is clear and unambiguous, it by no means 
forms “real” social groups. Instead it is one of the recruiting principles of 
corporate and of conflicting groups, though never the only one. It draws 
ordering lines over a large part of the society and defines boundaries 
within ethnic units.33 
Glatzer argues that political agreements usually come as a by-product of the tribal 
system. The difficulty with this system is that when a tribal leader makes bad decisions 
and loses authority, or if he dies, the transition to the next ruler is never smooth.34 Glatzer 
cites research and interviews with Pashtuns from different areas that show that Afghans 
from the southeast and eastern areas focus on “local categories,” whereas Afghans from 
the south and west “stress their tribal and ethnic identity first and foremost.”35 There is 
no method to simplify the differences among the peoples of Afghanistan are, and more 
important, how these differences relate to past and current insurgencies.36 
It is inaccurate simply to say that Afghans are diverse because Afghanistan 
comprises so many different social and ethnic groups—Afghans are distinct even within 
these groups and within geographic locations and similar sets. As subsequent chapters 
will show, working with local tribes is therefore very difficult. In a COIN environment, 
what works in one area might not work in another, and even within that same area, 
success can turn to disaster very easily. 
B. THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN 
Both the former Soviet Union and the Taliban ruled and governed Afghanistan to 
some extent from the late 1970s until late 2001. These entities operated very differently 
from the perspective of most Afghan citizens, but both had devastating effects on human 
rights and basic government-to-citizen responsibilities. During this period, insurgencies 
                                                 
33 Bernt Glatzer, “War and Boundaries in Afghanistan: Significance and Relativity of Local and Social 
Boundaries,” Die Weld Des Islams 41, no. 3 (November, 2001), 384. 
34 Ibid., 8. 
35 Ibid., 10. 
36 Ibid. 
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and tribal conflicts decimated any hope that Afghanistan would transform into a more 
progressive state. Exploring the failures of the Soviets and Taliban illustrates the 
importance of a capable force that provides basic needs to the citizen, and suggests that 
such a force is able to achieve that objective only if properly trained and equipped. 
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989 provides a pungent 
example of what not to do. In the face of technological sophistication, highly skilled 
soldiers, and overwhelming numbers, insurgencies can and will show that victory is not a 
numbers game and that guerilla warfare can overwhelm traditional forces.37 Many 
Afghans grew tired of Soviet intervention and wanted to break the “pro-communist” ties 
between the Afghanistan government and the Soviet Union.38 A quick overthrow of the 
communist-backed regime in 1979 led to the majority of the country breaking ties with 
local and distant Soviets institutions.39 The Russians knew this was a sign of weakness 
and had to teach the world what would happen if another country under their grasp tried 
the same. The Soviets started their campaign with heavy equipment, including tanks, 
fortified artillery units, and many ground forces to overwhelm and dominate the areas of 
operation. They lacked a unified COIN strategy, however, and did not consider how these 
assets might be useless in an insurgency.40 Heavy firepower and weapons are obviously 
needed to win any conflict or battle, but the Soviets quickly found that there was simply 
not enough available to complete the mission—indeed, there rarely is enough heavy 
equipment in an insurgency to turn the tide. Research suggests that it would have taken 
900,000 Soviets to completely occupy Afghanistan, which translates to a 10:1 ratio 
against the insurgents.41 
Soviet strategy and tactics against the mujahedeen fighters changed abruptly 
midway through the conflict as the Soviets began to realize that they needed a better 
strategy to train and educate the people. The problem with their methods was that they 
                                                 
37 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 11. 
38 Ibid., 12. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 13. 
41 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 19. 
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assumed most Afghans would relate to or favor communist ideals upon exposure to their 
educational and “hearts and minds” campaign.42 They were wrong, because they did not 
truly understand, or care to understand, the culture and tribes of Afghanistan. Bombing 
and committing brutal atrocities against the Afghans while proclaiming an educational 
program to help them fooled no one—especially not the Afghans. The conflict, of course, 
would have turned out differently were it not for intervention by Pakistan and U.S. With 
Pakistani training and U.S. weapons (mostly rifles and stingers), the mujahedeen were 
able to keep constant pressure against the Soviets.43 
The Soviets did not understand how local customs and ethnic divisions would 
shape their desired results, and their policy of “crush them” was trumped by the 
mujahedeen’s message that they will outlast the occupation.44 When rallying against an 
occupier, tribes and clans will have more passion and desire to join with groups that they 
might not normally relate to—they are temporarily united against one enemy. In this 
case, the Russians miscalculated the effectiveness of hard power and failed to truly shape 
and train the Afghans for the better. The problem from the start was that they wanted to 
kill everyone against the regime instead of using political and diplomatic tools to create a 
self-sustaining Afghanistan that might have continued as an ally. 
Ten long years of fighting the Soviets exhausted the Afghans. As a result of their 
numerous tribal and ethnic divisions, the disruption of Pakistani and U.S. involvement 
(with their different real objectives and mixed benefits), and the mujahedeen’s lack of 
governing abilities, the country was enveloped by total chaos. Drug lords and previous 
mujahedeen commanders ruled districts with an iron fist and, more times than not, fought 
each other as violently as they did the Soviets 45. The Kandahar and Helmand provinces 
were the most dysfunctional areas, with no governance or ability to maintain order from 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 14–15. 
43 Ibid., 15–17. 
44 Ibid., 19–20. 
45 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to 
Modernity (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 56. 
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any leader or group.46 The formation of the Taliban, who were seen by some as the stuff 
of legend, simply reveals that the people were tired of the drug lords and commanders 
taxing and brutalizing their people. The Taliban began as a small group that formed to 
take out another group that had killed, robbed, and raped a family traveling in southern 
Afghanistan.47 The important insight is that, owing to lack of government controls, the 
Taliban was not only formed, but also won the prize of all COIN and insurgent 
objectives—the people. 
By 1996, the Taliban started to expand and form cells all over Afghanistan. The 
south and southwest served as their strongholds and proved their legitimacy, since 
rampant disorder and chaos had plagued that region.48 Along with military success 
against other drug lords, mujahedeen groups, and former commanders, the Taliban started 
to gain support in resources and supplies from Pakistan.49 The Taliban accrued the 
resources they needed to establish legitimate rule and began to govern the populace. 
Control of the capital was the most sought-after prize of the Taliban; by the end of 1997, 
the Taliban was able to achieve this goal by seizing Kabul, and with it, control of the 
country. Because of the bloodshed and violence, many small groups continued fighting or 
fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran.50 
A major by-product of the insurgency with the Soviets and the civil war was the 
emergence of Al Qaeda. These fighters witnessed firsthand the atrocities of the Soviets, 
and received support from the U.S. to take up arms as a unified Muslim group against the 
Soviets.51 The Taliban had not been in a position to receive international recognition, 
mostly because of their human-rights violations, especially against women, and now they 
allowed Al Qaeda to train and equip their forces in Afghanistan. As Osama Bin Laden 
and Mullah Omar started to work together, the international community started to get 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 57. 
47 Ibid., 58. 
48 Ibid., 60–61. 
49 Ibid., 61. 
50 Ibid., 65–66. 
51 Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 78. 
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nervous.  Bin Laden supplied the finances, and Omar provided the people and space to 
build an army. Because of the Taliban’s relationship with Al Qaeda, Pakistan was the key 
country working and supporting the Taliban; but even Pakistan started to distance itself—
as much as they could, since Afghanistan is a neighbor that constantly pulls and pushes 
events in Pakistan as well.52 The international community decisively turned its back on 
Afghanistan when the Taliban destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001 and 
strengthened its efforts to support Al Qaeda, even though some Taliban leaders wanted 
nothing to do with Al Qaeda.53 Insurgencies, civil war, and lack of international 
community support and recognition created an environment that the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda capitalized on.54 
For the purposes of this analysis, the main point is that the Afghan people have 
been through an unpleasant history, shaped in modern times by the barrel of the Soviet 
rifle, numerous tribe and drug-lord battles, and the emergence of the Taliban. The 
suffering people of Afghanistan had no alternatives to solve the predicament that started 
in 1979; the Taliban’s decision to allow Al Qaeda to develop a stronghold only made the 
situation worse. 
C. A TRAINING MISSION EXAMINED 
The background of Afghanistan is important in understanding how social 
dynamics affect the populace and how previous conflicts and actions shaped the 
Afghanistan of today. This section examines a mission in Afghanistan conducted by the 
author in 2012, with the purpose of training and equipping Afghans in Helmand 
Province. Missions always differ, but this account provides details that link with the 
accounts of other researchers and authors to potentially lead to better strategies. 
The mission directives were as follows: “Counterinsurgency Training Center–
Afghanistan (CTC-A) enhances coalition forces (CF), Afghan National Security Forces, 
and other Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) agencies 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 79–82. 
53 Ibid., 81. 
54 Ibid., 98. 
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capabilities to reduce insurgent influence through the delivery of regionally-focused, 
timely, and relevant best practice counterinsurgency training and education that fosters 
greater unity of effort among all stakeholders in order to facilitate the development of a 
secure and stable Afghanistan.”55 
In such a complex and dynamic mission, adaptation would be key to success. 
Training Afghans was an important element, but even more important was to select the 
right Afghan actors to carry on the training mission once International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) departed. The leaders of the COIN academy in Kabul briefed all 
staff that the academic training mission was going to end sooner than expected.  No 
matter how external and internal factors played out, the number-one priority was to train 
and instruct Afghans, at all costs. What happened next is the focus of this case study. The 
author was a region chief for a mobile training team (MTT)—by far his most challenging 
deployment ever. His experience sets forth a valuable account of current train-and-equip 
practices in action.56 
To become a COIN instructor in Afghanistan, the first step was to complete the 
counterinsurgency-leader course (CLC) at the COIN academy in Kabul. The CLC was 
packed with exercises and lessons on everything and anything to do with insurgency. 
Practical tests consisted of teach-backs, in which the staff ensured that new instructors 
could instruct effectively through an interpreter. Every U.S. member of ISAF had 
received weapons and cultural training before arriving in theater; the aim of this course 
was to learn to work with an interpreter and understand COIN fundamentals. The 
ultimate goal was to train Afghan forces with the same material and have them continue 
the mission once ISAF departed. Each MTT consisted of a small team with a regional 
chief in charge of the mission. The author was assigned as an instructor and region chief 
for Helmand Province. 
                                                 
55 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Training Center–Afghanistan (CTC-A), A Counterinsurgent’s 
Guidebook: The application of COIN doctrine and theory, Version 2 (Kabul, Afghanistan: CTC-A, 2011), 
1. 
56 Author was the COIN MTT Region Chief for most of the deployment and operations officer and 
instructor during the middle of the deployment. 
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The mission was not only to provide COIN training to all forces, but to certify 
strong Afghan army and police instructors under the instructor-development program 
(IDP), so they could teach and carry on the mission once coalition forces departed. The 
team consisted of numerous active and reserve U.S. Army officers, along with some 
DynCorp civilians with military backgrounds.57 The mission included instruction at 
Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) Camp Shorabak, 215
th
 Afghan National 
Army (ANA) Corps, and Joint Sustainment Academy Southwest (JSAS) (which were 
Afghan special forces, mostly at Camp Leatherneck), and the Regional Training Center 
(RTC) LashkarGah4/5 Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Center, which 
trained police and border police, along with a few small fire bases located throughout the 
region. Even with many constraints (such as shrinking budgets and timetables), the need 
to train as many Afghans as possible was primary. Certifying instructors to carry on the 
COIN torch was the secondary focus. The heart of the mission was to train Afghans—
especially police—at every given opportunity. 
Managing unified objectives is challenging in an ISAF environment. Danish, 
British, and U.S. forces worked in the same areas, and even at times the same buildings, 
training and instructing Afghans in completely different subjects. The challenge was to 
coordinate and schedule COIN needs to instruct, with what they were already teaching. 
Since many teams travel to different locations, this required much coordination with CF. 
The author understood the importance of scheduling courses as quickly as possible. The 
Danish team who were mentoring RMTC personnel scheduled six COIN courses (two- to 
three-day tracks) between their infantry basic course and/or other instruction that focused 
on training noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The other area of focus was Lashkar Gah, 
since it was the major training site for police and border police—a critical area, since 
police and border police received the least amount of COIN training. The British were 
able to schedule nine training tracks over the following four months. There were only 
three COIN instructors from the Afghan police, compared to the forty instructors for the 
ANA qualified by the previous team. 
                                                 
57 Cannot emphasize how lucky the author was to have this team. Some MTTs had no experience—
many CF members who were on their first operational deployment. 
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With the training and logistics part of the mission scheduled, what to focus on 
next became the challenge. The author ordered his team to increase anti-corruption 
training using practical exercises and videos in Pashtu and Dari, produced by the training 
center in Kabul. This training was the major focus for Afghan police and border police. 
While police training was going on, other officers working for the same team continued 
the same push at local training commands in camps Bastion and Leatherneck. The final 
piece of the puzzle was to identify an Afghan who would take over the MTT once ISAF 
departed. The Afghan training officer at RMTC was chosen, and he provided Afghan 
soldiers to attend the instructor course and start training other Afghans with the MTT. He 
managed all training and classes for about 5,000–7,000 recruits a year and provided 
superb support that got more classes scheduled. Very importantly, he selected top ANA 
sergeants whom he felt would be good instructors. 
The entire process flowed as follows: first, a class of ten to thirty students (police 
or army) was trained on three major COIN lessons: insurgency, COIN, and a framework 
brief. Second, the top NCOs were selected, sometimes only one or two, and 
trained/instructed on the spot through the instructor course, which covered how to teach, 
what not to do, and how to capture the audience. Finally, the selected instructors taught 
back to the class the main lessons that the MTT originally taught. Having completed the 
process, the Afghan personnel received a certificate with their picture, noting that they 
were qualified instructors for COIN. The critical point was how the MTT incorporated 
the Afghans into future training. These same ANA/Afghanistan National Police (ANP) 
instructors would start teaching the basic COIN classes for the next scheduled course, 
which allowed the MTT to slowly step back and put some pressure on the Afghan 
training officer to coordinate future classes and decide which instructors would teach. 
Even with numerous training barriers, including being in a combat zone, the MTT 
qualified forty-one instructors and trained roughly 1,200 Afghans during the six-month 
tour. The mission overall yielded roughly 90 instructors with over 4,000 soldiers trained 
in COIN during a two-year period. It was not easy, especially as green-on-blue incidents 
increased, but it was an overall successful mission because the trainers focused on having 
buy-in from the local Afghan forces. The emphasis was on training Afghans, and more 
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importantly, choosing the right ones to work the MTT out of a job—ensuring Afghans 
training Afghans. 
D. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Every mission, no matter what or where, will have problems. The majority of 
training and equipping problems, the author argues, can be solved at the tactical and 
operational level. Thus military adaptation must be promoted at these levels. That is not 
to say that strict compliance to certain directives and procedures is not needed, but 
training human subjects and assembling a piece of ordnance have very different outcomes 
when those checklists are not followed.58 The social terrain in Afghanistan requires much 
adaptation because of the diverse differences within regions. 
First and foremost, the MTT led by the author was highly adaptive and did not 
follow the uniform guidelines and checklists on how to train Afghans. The 
recommendations that this case study of Helmand province provides may not work 
equally well in another part of Afghanistan, such as Herat Province. Nevertheless, there 
are some crucial lessons to consider in understanding the “how” part of the train-and-
equip mission. 
1. Problems Encountered 
The first issue encountered was linguistic difficulties; the majority of Helmand 
students spoke Pashto and the entire curriculum given to instructors for the MTTs was in 
Dari. Most interpreters did not speak both Pashto and Dari, and the majority of the 
interpreters from the COIN academy could not speak Pashto well. 
Illiteracy and delivery methods were another huge issue. The majority of ANA 
and ANP are virtually illiterate; the country has a literacy rate of roughly 39%, which 
meant, for the most part, that six or seven soldiers out of ten could not read or write.59 
The entire course, especially for certifying instructors, was PowerPoint dependent. 
                                                 
58 Author has experience doing both missions. 
59 UNICEF Afghanistan Country Office (ACO), Education Factsheet (Kabul, Afghanistan: ACO, 
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Training institutions in Helmand did not have computers or projectors and fuel delivery 
for generators was unreliable. 
In addition, the course of instruction was too long for Afghans. It was extremely 
difficult to get courses scheduled. The IDP course had numerous PowerPoint briefs and 
three practical exercises, and required five full days to complete (the hours computed 
were in US metrics, meaning for Afghans it would take about ten days), not counting the 
days used to teach Afghans in a large setting. The material was too advanced for Afghans 
and it was not realistic to expect them to continue training once ISAF departed. 
A major problem was that the curriculum and instruction were intended for a 
soldier or Marine to understand and to practice COIN downrange. This is not the same as 
teaching Afghans how to teach COIN. The focus should be on teaching, vice “how-to” 
incorporate best COIN practice from CF; the same material that the author learned at the 
CLC in Kabul was what the Afghans were getting. 
There was insufficient focus on police/border police and anti-corruption training. 
A COIN team is needed in every police training center. A fully embedded team that lives 
with the police did not exist; the MTT traveled whenever possible and the author tried 
many times to station two team members permanently at the centers, but did not get 
support or approval from higher authority.60 
2. Recommendations 
The recommendations from this case study apply to the author’s mission to 
Afghanistan, but more importantly, they can provide valuable lessons for future COIN 
train and equip missions.   
a. Know the Culture 
Know your audience—understand their culture. The MTT had to convert 
everything in Pashtu and Dari since the students were so diverse in Helmand. Some even 
                                                 
60 It was very difficult to work with foreign nations when they owned/were in charge of the mission. It 
seemed to the author that everyone was desperately trying to control one aspect without interference from 
other entities. Lack of teamwork across the board was an issue when it came down to actually training 
Afghans. 
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spoke Pashtu and wrote in Dari, or vice versa. It was 2012, eleven years after the conflict 
started, and CF still did not truly understand the culture. 
b. Make the COIN (IDP Course) Realistic 
The IDP course was changed to three days from a realistic ten-day block because 
it was too difficult to reserve the needed days, attention spans were too short, and other 
required training courses from the Afghans were competing for time. The last two days 
were used for Afghan students to teach the masses, vice CF. The takeaway here is that the 
material must be realistic and the forces in training must be willing to continue the 
training once the support nation departs. The goal is to develop sustainable training and 
qualify instructors who will carry on. They must have confidence and not be 
overwhelmed. 
c. Be Mindful of Illiteracy and Method of Delivery 
Ensure that some pictures are used for important messages, since a large majority 
of the audience cannot read. Print all lessons in both languages and ensure PowerPoint-
dependent courses are not the primary method of delivery. Develop flipcharts for all 
training lessons and make copies to hand out when possible. The MTT used the 
multimedia center at Camp Leatherneck to print out large paper versions of all lessons 
and hand-built wooden stands to attach them to. This was the most successful training 
change incorporated, because Afghans like to see large pictures and catch phrases. From 
a practical standpoint, since locations did not have a power supply, it was important that 
training method be sustainable by the Afghans. 
d. Ensure Afghan Buy-in 
Afghans will continue training once ISAF departs if they are confident in 
delivering the content. The author’s MTT used Afghan NCOs and training officers to 
decide which lessons they thought worked best. The MTT was there to guide or shift 
direction if needed, but the Afghans will continue the mission only if they believe in it. 
We cannot train Afghan forces like American forces. 
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e. Form Small Training Teams 
The author observed that smaller teams allowed the forces to leave the main bases 
and blend in better with the locals. This mindset allowed teams to travel more often and 
promote unity, since the forces are able to work with Afghans at their bases. 
f. Focus on Policing 
The author’s MTT went “all-in” to train police and border police at the different 
training locations. This part of the mission was not a priority for many senior leaders or 
previous training teams, but most insurgencies have a repeated theme of corrupt or 
violent police forces, which leads to loss of popular support. 
While these recommendations are not made with a claim of universal 
applicability, stemming as they do from one specific training mission, it should be noted 
that the mission was successful overall and the recommendations furnish practical insight 
on how to train to equip future COIN operations.61 
E. CONCLUSION 
Unlike the following two chapters, which focus on train-and-equip missions at a 
national level, this example was a first-hand account of a mission at the lowest level of 
instruction. Thus it contains no bureaucratic barriers, explanations from afar, or mixed 
numbers that might distort the truth. The author’s team achieved success by adapting to 
its environment and focusing on training objectives. Obviously, higher authority has a 
much broader view and much more responsibility for the mission in Afghanistan, but the 
fact remains that training local forces is a demanding and much required mission for 
success in a COIN environment. Further analysis of the cultural misunderstandings, 
reliance on heavy equipment and conventional forces, and lack of real training objectives 
that have plagued nations working in Afghanistan is presented in the last chapter. 
There has been some debate on how important the policing mission is and 
whether contractors doing the majority of this mission was part of the mistake in 
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Afghanistan. Many low-paid non-Afghan civilian police and security personnel began 
working for the same contracting firm as a member of the author’s MTT, and the 
$100,000 plus salaries that they were making, coupled with the quality of their 
performance, were not warranted. 62Much more research is needed to truly examine this 
debate, but these facts were consistent with the poor performance seen during the earlier 
years from Afghan police with contractors that trained them who bragged, “I do this job 
for the opportunity to kill the enemies of my country and also get that boat I always 
wanted.”63 The contractors who worked with the author were superb, consisting of 
former military officers or senior enlisted retired personnel. But, like the mission 
examined in this chapter, experience and results will vary. The author has seen many 
contractors who were horrible performers and ambassadors for the ISAF mission. There 
were probably just as many bad training teams traveling throughout Afghanistan as well, 
not focusing on the prize: security for the Afghans. 
The recommendations in this case study are distilled from what a specific team in 
Helmand Province actually accomplished. The lessons could be posed as questions to 
construct a baseline model for future teams that must train forces during an insurgency: 
What are the culture and population like? How do they learn? What are their capabilities? 
These questions should be answered when taking on a training mission. There is no way 
to kill every insurgent; culture and local autonomy are more important than a centralized 
government to some; and policing, coupled with real training and equipping objectives, 
can achieve satisfactory results. Shohna-ba-Shohna (shoulder-to-shoulder) was the only 
way to meet these realities.64 
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III. TURKEY AND THE PKK 
Many states throughout the world have battled insurgencies and are fighting 
legacy conflicts because of various unfinished conflicts. Some of the fragmentary causes 
preventing a ceasefire or peaceful resolution include overzealous military forces, 
unsettled ethnic issues, and a lack of state institutions that provide basic, day-to-day 
needs for the populace. Turkey, like most states that have felt the damage of an 
insurgency, has experienced all three.65 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party or Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) battled the government and the people of Turkey for their 
belief and simple platform that bellowed existence. 66 They felt the Turkish government 
was preventing the social and ethnic freedom they were entitled to and that they were 
excluded from the Turkish constitution.67 
The Turkish state has had tremendous results in its dealings with the PKK, though 
Turkey continues to face challenges in this regard. Turkish military forces from 1984–
1999 were able to defeat the PKK insurgency because they adapted tactics with proper 
train–and-equip objectives to eliminate the PKK’s physical and psychological bonds with 
the population and correctly used heavy kinetic measures when warranted. 68 By 
examining the history leading up to the insurgency, the dynamics of the PKK insurgency, 
and Turkey’s counterinsurgency response, a better understanding of military adaptation 
with appropriate train-and-equip practices and policy implications may result.  
A. HISTORY OF THE PKK 
Before delving into the insurgency and the state’s response, a brief examination of 
Kurdish ethnic issues, the background of the PKK’s leader and founder, Abdullah 
Ocalan, and the history and start of the PKK are warranted. Kurdish identity and ethnic 
separation in Turkey has caused much turmoil. There are different explanations as to 
                                                 





what makes up the Kurdish people, and different schools of thought have focused on how 
governments “often justify their policies or actions by using history.”69 The theories 
concerning the origins of the Kurdish people vary from the Mendes which was occupied 
by the Assyrians, ancient Sumeria, and even the ancient Turkic or Persian bloodlines.70 
This ambiguity explains why the Kurdish population has had such a difficult time 
establishing identity and cultural baselines for support. The many explanations and a 
dearth of unifying ethnic similarities explain, to some extent, why Kurdish movements in 
Turkey and places like Iraq usually end in bloodshed. The Kurds not only fight for 
existence, they also fight within among themselves because of identity and ethnic 
dilemmas. Regardless of their origins, the Kurds in Turkey wanted a Kurdish state to be 
established in southeast Turkey—and they were willing to go to war for it.71 
Most of the Kurdish population lives in rural farming villages and districts. 
Poverty and arduous work with low pay are common, and most, with the exception of 
landowners, have had a difficult life and role in society. The modern history of Kurdish 
insurgency centers on Abdullah Ocalan, born in Sanliurfa, Turkey, in 1948 as the eldest 
of seven children.72 Violence was his technique of choice at an early age, which helps 
explain some of his later methods. Revenge and violence were instilled early; as a case in 
point, a story claims that when Ocalan was jumped by a group of kids and came home 
bloody, his mother kicked him out and demanded he get revenge.73 Ocalan has been 
quoted as proudly having “cracked the heads of many children” during his childhood.74 
Another revealing episode in his life concerns the marriage or sale, as believed by some, 
of his sister. Ocalan was unhappy that she was forced to marry a man from another 
village and wanted to change the long-standing tradition that treated woman like 
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property.75 This psychological background is useful in understanding who Ocalan was. If 
ending an insurgency is desired, understanding one’s rival’s perspective of what he is 
truly fighting for should be examined.  
Since the Republic of Turkey’s establishment in the early 1920s, harsh anti-
Kurdish laws and doctrines have made it difficult for Kurdish people to make a living, or 
even obtain the basic rights of their Kurdish language and birth names. Kurdish activities 
and identities were stripped from the history books, and any sort of rebellion was met 
with severe and quick military action.76 The Kurdish movement was suppressed until the 
military coup of 1960. This was considered the most liberal time since the formation of 
the republic, when basic freedoms like protesting, an independent press, and the 
establishment of social and ethnic groups set the stage for PKK.77 
The freedoms that came after the 1960 military coup led to violent uprisings that 
endangered Turkey’s reputation and creditability. In 1971, another military coup 
occurred—this time the military wanted to ensure that the constitution would quash the 
freedoms that several Kurdish movements were exploiting and which had resulted in 
violence, due to the state’s reaction. Social and ethnic groups that had been given 
freedom and autonomy were completely shut down.78 During this period, Ocalan enrolled 
in Ankara University to study political science to help answer the “socialism and 
Kurdishness” questions that had plagued him and his movement.79 As a student, he 
participated in many protests and finally ended up in jail for protesting Turkey’s killing 
of some Kurdish militants who had kidnapped three NATO technicians.80 In prison, 
Ocalan shared many stories with other Kurds and realized that many other Kurdish 
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groups were forming, with different agendas. He began to realize the political power he 
needed to make a true push for an independent Kurdish state.81 
The insurgency stage was set—regardless of the decisions and actions made by 
Turkey, the Kurdish movement was destined to be uncontrollable because of the way 
Turkey had handled the situation since 1923. Turkey had crushed any form of political 
rights given to the Kurds and did not allow any identity or cultural freedoms—a typical 
recipe for state disaster.82 
B. THE INSURGENCY 
The government of Turkey was, without question, one of the main reasons the 
PKK and other insurgent groups were able to thrive. There were four coalition 
governments during 1975–1980, and none could provide the basic needs of the 
population or function properly as a government.83 This contributed to many power 
struggles by Kurdish groups to bring the people under a unified strategy in response to 
the lack of government control; but groups like Kawa and the Ozgurluk Yolu, to name a 
few, lacked the organization and structure that Ocalan called for. Other groups used the 
Kurdish struggle as a false front to get other things on their agenda accomplished. None 
was able to appeal to the people, especially the twenty-year-olds who were ready to act 
for the cause.84 It is important to note how vital charismatic leaders are in an insurgency. 
Mao argued this significant fact, stating that the leader of a movement must be able to 
mobilize the young people, because they will in turn lead the fight at the smaller unit 
level until the “last drop of their blood” is gone.85 When a leader masters that 
psychological bond, it is very difficult to change his disciples’ way of thinking after the 
fact—especially in a COIN environment. 
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Little to no autonomy was given to the Kurdish people by the government, and 
internal disputes among Kurdish groups and lack of equal opportunity led to the forming 
of the PKK. Aliza Marcus observes that many think the PKK captivated the poor and 
uneducated masses because of their unified belief in a lack of opportunity and 
representation; whereas Marcus argues that the early soldiers of the PKK were educated 
Kurds who had made a better life for themselves than the previous generation and were 
aiming to join the Turkish mainstream. It is very important to highlight that poor 
opportunities and living conditions did not outweigh the Kurdish identity and nationalism 
struggle.86 This suggests another difficult COIN mission—how to change the minds of 
those who believe they are fighting for an identity. 
Many Kurdish groups continued to organize and mobilize, but none was able to 
capture the momentum of the PKK, especially because of the effective leadership of 
Ocalan.87 There were without question numerous ideals and styles that the different 
Kurdish groups were fighting for, ranging from identity struggles, to sought-after or 
perceived-as-occupied territory, to Mao-like ideals and warfare strategies. 88 But the PKK 
kept it simple. The problem, as defined by the PKK: Turkey’s colonization with 
capitalistic trends in Kurdish regions. The solution: “armed struggle,” blended with a 
socialist approach to counter the state’s government and military.89 The PKK, due mostly 
to Ocalan, were able to unite a large armed Kurdish movement with goals and ideology in 
a simple format with far-reaching implications. The government found itself confronted 
with an armed group with a honed-in focus and objectives and crosshairs centered 
sharply on Istanbul. 
As the insurgency got out of control, extremists were fighting and killing people 
among themselves, which led to hundreds of murders in the late 1970s and by 1979 
resulted in the murder of twenty people per day. The armed forces of Turkey had no 
choice but to impose martial law. In 1980, General Chief of Staff Kenan Evren 
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announced in a radio address that the military was taking over the country—all regions 
and government duties. Numerous politicians were arrested, insurgent groups were 
isolated, and many towns were locked down and cut off from external contact. The next 
three years resulted in thousands of Kurds and other extremists killed, captured, and 
tortured. This all contributed to the PKK’s transformation into a strong paramilitary 
group in 1984, after the military returned power to democratic rule.90 This was an 
enormous success for the insurgency, because it caused the government to overreact and 
restrict freedoms of the entire populace and to the most extreme, was an immense factor 
to the takeover of the government. 
An important factor that led to some favorable conditions for the insurgency was 
urbanization during 1976–1980. Sayari and Hoffman argue that urbanization and 
terrorism do not necessarily have a direct cause-and-effect connection, but “social, 
economic, and political” urbanization problems did allow the PKK to spread influence 
and mobilize the urban poor; violence started in the countryside, but ended up delivering 
a major blow to cities like Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, resulting in many bombings and 
assassinations.91 
In the late 1970s, Turkey had major squatter- and shantytowns called gecekondus, 
which proved to be a good breeding ground for social unrest. Different groups in these 
areas used extremist influence to get poor residents to help carry out violent acts, 
regardless of terrorist group ties or ideology.92 In other words, the people of the 
gecekondus were being used, because of their low status, to perpetrate violence on behalf 
of terrorist groups. The insurgents (the PKK especially) seized control of poor areas and 
were able to influence them without reference to the specific Kurdish cause, because the 
PKK, not the government, provided basic needs, including food, security, and utilities. 
Terrorist groups such as the PKK were able to keep government forces out by gaining 
popular support; gecekondus were considered “no-man’s lands” that police and other 
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Turkish government agencies refused to support or intervene in, for numerous reasons.93 
The insurgents were able to connect immigrants and the poor on a platform of unity and 
close-knit communal ties.94 
Insurgents will always prey on the poor and displaced, because what other options 
do dispossessed persons truly have: stay poor and forgotten, or join a group that provides 
basic needs and hope? It is a big mistake for any government to ignore the have-nots of 
society, not only because of the moral duty to provide for all the people, but also because, 
from the COIN point of view, these areas are without question an insurgent breeding 
ground. The PKK exploited this government weakness. 
C. STATE RESPONSE AND COIN 
This section details how Turkey’s military practiced COIN tactics on behalf of the 
state. Christopher Paul breaks down the insurgency into four phases using Aliza Marcus’s 
data points in Blood and Belief: 1) the initial phase (1984–1986); 2) repression and 
resettlement (1987–1989); 3) insurgency growth (1990–1993); and 4) the triumph of the 
big stick (1994–1999).95 
1. The Initial Phase (1984–1986) 
The social dynamic in Turkey during this period was demanding for Kurds and 
non-Kurds alike. The 1982 Turkish constitution focused on Turkish nationalism, 
emphasizing language and identity while disregarding Kurdish issues and struggles, very 
much as in the early 1900s. The many rival political groups in support of the Kurds made 
it difficult for either the state or the PKK to gain support from the populace. The PKK 
had to play hardball and force their way into villages for support. During this time, the 
PKK were more feared then the military and police, and even fellow Kurdish citizens 
turned against them. It was a time that both sides called the “battle of propaganda,” and 
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the PKK was losing.96 Turkish forces, especially the police, focused on winning over the 
population and were able to sway the public through propaganda that showed how brutal 
and violent the PKK was. The Turkish government was winning. 
2. Phase Two (1987–1989) 
The tide turned in the second phase: Turkey’s military forces started to lose their 
grasp on the insurgency situation and created problems with their heavy-handed tactics. 
Turkey trained its soldiers to separate the insurgents from the populace so they could kill 
the right people, but, inevitably, translating this policy to the tactical level had mixed 
results; some villagers were forced out of their towns and, if they resisted, were usually 
killed. The PKK won this round of the propaganda war because most Kurdish villages 
did not have media outlets that showed state sponsorship in the successful COIN fight 
with the PKK, or stories that highlighted PKK violence and intimidation. The Turkish 
military forces lost popular support during this phase.97 
3. Phase Three (1990–1993) 
The insurgency continued to ride a wave of popularity during the third phase. The 
PKK coordinated mass movements within the Kurdish population that made Turkish 
forces overreact—a huge success for the insurgency. Besides goading the military, the 
PKK was able to provide basic day-to-day needs for the populace and control complete 
areas and villages without Turkish intervention. The hills and villages proved to be 
challenging for the Turkish forces, as expected in this guerilla-warfare-like environment. 
The COIN forces lost during this phase.98 
4. The Fourth Phase (1994–1999) 
From 1994 to 1999, the fourth and final phase, Turkish forces turned into an 
aggressive military machine. They were killing and arresting any PKK or suspected PKK 
members at a very fast pace and, at times, with complete disregard of the populace. 
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Marcus details that a Turkish commander was killed in the city of Lice, so the military 
responded by blocking off the village and removing all external ties while going house to 
house. The result was over 100 civilians killed or wounded.99 The military was far from 
perfect, but did have some very significant COIN practices: they cut off external support, 
hurt the PKK’s command-and-control element, and improved their kinetic actions. 
Turkish forces started to remove external support institutions in Iraq by destroying PKK 
training centers and used military air and ground assets to kill members of the PKK. The 
COIN mission focused on destroying the support links that made the PKK successful: 
leadership, food and supplies, and external/internal support. The Turkish military 
captured Ocalan and eventually won the support of the populace after dismantling the 
PKK’s functioning institutions.100 
Paul argues that it is difficult to study the PKK case because of a lack of unbiased 
information and data. He further states that the PKK never really threatened the Turkish 
state.101 Studying the dynamics of the insurgency and COIN responses by the military 
forces might prove otherwise. The battle with the PKK raged since the late 1970s. The 
numerous military coups and attempts in the past twenty years, coupled with economic 
woes, could have continued and brought Turkey down if military forces were not able to 
destroy the PKK. The Turkish military was battle tested for fifteen years of engaged 
combat operations and their COIN ups and downs provide some best-practice train and 
equip recommendations. 
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Case study of the PKK yields some obvious answers and results: heavy-handed 
tactics from the government are frequently counterproductive; if basic needs are not 
provided to a people, then insurgents will fill the void; and whenever an ethnic group is 
repressed, violence and armed struggle shows its ugly head. But a closer analysis during 
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the different phases, honing in on how the military trained and equipped its forces—the 
good and bad—provides some virtuous COIN practices for future conflicts and struggles. 
1. Military and Police Forces Must Improve on Propaganda Tactics 
As most experience has proven, insurgents do a much better job at propaganda. 
Mao, in On Guerilla Warfare, expresses that the propaganda officer is subordinate only 
to the battalion commander and has as much responsibility as the executive officer.102 
There is no COIN doctrine, foreign or domestic, that is able to counter the insurgent’s 
power to sway the people by propaganda—the insurgents are the masters. The Turkish 
police and military forces were able to outwork the insurgents at first, or to some degree, 
preventing the PKK from winning the propaganda war. 
2. As an Insurgency Increases, Proportional or Stronger Reactions in 
Military Force May Hinder Overall COIN Objectives 
This point is tricky because Turkish forces were able to defeat the insurgency by 
using strong military forces—but they won because they did it correctly. At first, Turkish 
forces overreacted and angered most of the population. The major reason this was not 
catastrophic for Turkish forces was because the PKK were conducting operations too 
violently and losing public support. 
3. Military Forces Must Work with Local Governing Institutions: 
Nation Building Is Part of the Mission, Whether the Military Likes It 
or Not 
Turkish regional governors were given new powers and developed better 
partnerships among the police, military, and government institutions. Most militaries do 
not want to take on this mission, but it is a must.103 
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4. Training and Equipping Military Forces Appropriately to Defeat an 
Insurgency Is Crucial for COIN Objectives 
Fighter jets and heavy armored equipment was useless in the mountains and 
villages—and at times caused too much collateral damage, which shifted the populace 
towards the insurgents. A related problem is that Turkish soldiers, like most in COIN 
campaigns, did not like leaving their armed/secured bases at night to engage the enemy. 
The insurgents capitalized on this weakness and had free movement at night.104 Maiah 
Jaskoski in Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes, confirms this possibly 
epidemic military problem in COIN operations. Her focus is on Ecuador, Peru, and 
Columbia, but applies to military actions regardless of region and culture.105 COIN 
forces must have proper equipment and train suitably to counter insurgent progress. 
5. COIN Forces Should Be Established in the Heart of Each City or 
Village to Be Among the Local People 
Large, gated bases do not provide locals with the protection they need, and, 
sometimes even more important, allow insurgents to blend in with the people and have 
more opportunities for influence. Turkish forces adapted to their environment and trained 
and equipped their forces into “mobile strike forces” that lived and breathed in the 
villages and cities where the PKK once had free movement.106 This was a huge tactical 
success that allowed Turkish military/police forces to be more aggressive and actually 
know whom to kill and whom to work or negotiate with—at the tactical level, where it 
should be. 
6. Use Kinetic Forces When Needed—Full Force at the Right Target 
COIN is a tough mission for any military, and at times, less force and more 
political and social action or reaction is needed. But one should never forget that 
sometimes the only way to remove bad people, and especially violent insurgents, is to kill 
them. One major reason for Turkey’s success was that they focused on the leader. Once 
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they removed Ocalan and released his hard grip on all aspects of operations, the 
movement crumbled. Turkish forces, by severing supply and communication lines 
internally (by means of embedded security teams in the villages), and externally (by 
cutting off Iraqi training centers), were able to use military forces the way they should 
be—against the insurgents, and not the people.107 
By 1999, Turkish forces had adapted COIN tactics and practices that demoralized 
and weakened the PKK; they had some very challenging times subsequently and 
continued to be tested with PKK violent actions, but nonetheless their experience 
provides some good practices and lessons to consider in other insurgencies. The Turkish 
security forces enjoyed a COIN win, but as the government continues to negotiate with 
Ocalan, civil–military relations within Turkey will be a deciding factor in the success or 
failure of negotiations. Modern Turkey will be far from having complete peace with the 
Kurdish population and the PKK until they address Kurdish ethnic issues and stop 
oppressing this lost minority. A thorn in the side to some Turkish political and military 
leaders is the U.S. and NATO; both have an impact on past and present Turkish military 
actions. Further research on this topic is beyond the scope of this analysis, but could 
provide a better understanding of the motivations for Turkey’s actions. Walter Posch 
states that most Turkish forces feel the U.S. and NATO failed to support their armed 
struggle and that they adapted and trained themselves regardless of dictates from Brussels 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]).108 This type of environment could create 
more tension with the Kurdish–Turkish struggle.  
The true test will come if and when the Turkish military and national politics 
collide again and allow another large-scale insurgency that makes the government lose 
control. Turkey will need continued monetary and training support from NATO, and the 
U.S. to some extent, to continue to be a convincing world force. That aside, Turkey has 
proven that their military force is capable of handling internal insurgency disputes, which 
proves they are a credible world military force. 
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IV. COLOMBIA AND THE FARC 
The first two cases in this thesis dealt with deep-rooted insurgency factors: 
internal and external (Afghanistan) and ethnic collisions (Turkey). Colombia, the final 
case study, demonstrates how a nation dealt with large violent groups that represented the 
impoverished populace (or enjoyed a perception of representation) and colossal drug-
trafficking actions that created chaos for the people and government. The Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP)—or 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People's Army, better known as the FARC—
is an insurgent group that at times had the entire nation under its hand of terror. Like most 
insurgents, the FARC caused much turmoil and violence, but the way the FARC operated 
was unusual to some—they strongly believed they were fighting for the poor. 
The overwhelmed military forces of Colombia underestimated the power and 
social movement the FARC was able to achieve. After many hard lessons and through 
numerous factors, to be examined in detail, the military forces of Colombia were able to 
defeat the FARC—not completely, but in the sense of winning back their country and 
decreasing violent acts carried out by the FARC. The Colombian civil–military 
leadership revamped their state and military system, which resulted in a superb example 
of government-military adaptation during an insurgency, and overhauled train-and-equip 
policies within the military organization.109 Exploration of Colombia’s brutal history 
(which ultimately led to the formation of the FARC), the dynamics of the actual 
insurgency, and the COIN efforts of Colombia’s government and military forces will 
again illustrate how military adaptation can be successful when coupled with proper 
train-and-equip best practices. 
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Like most nations, Columbia’s current events have been shaped by historical 
actions that seem to have come from nowhere and may surprise some as to why they ever 
happened. Colombia has endured political and social hardships for 100 years, and 
examining this violent past is needed before exploring the insurgency conflict with the 
FARC. There is no question that the FARC is an insurgent guerilla organization, but the 
events leading up to the formation of the FARC explain its motives and reasoning. 
The instability of Colombia during the 19
th
 century contributed to a strong rivalry 
between liberals and conservatives. Most nations throughout the world have some sort of 
tension between the left and right political parties, but Colombia’s experience with these 
two major political factions was disastrous—for the state and people. Numerous armed 
conflicts led up to the “War of a Thousand Days” in the late 1800s to 1902.110 Roughly 
100,000 liberals and conservatives lost their lives, and the people and government of 
Colombia were in major hysteria. Lack of resources—human and capital—combined 
with insufficient government funds, led to the downfall of the liberal party and created an 
environment for conservatives to take advantage.111 Ruling with an iron fist, the 
Colombian government, now controlled by the conservative party, nominated General 
Rafael Reyes as president, a leader who had much experience in the thousand-day 
conflict and was picked to lead Colombia into a better 20
th
 century. The minority party 
had some role in the government after a few years and Colombia started to look like a 
democratic nation; political assemblies started to organize and structure how candidates 
could be elected for political office. Property ownership and literacy requirements 
excluded much of the population from this political process. This disenfranchisement was 
a guaranteed recipe for disaster and led to religious influence unwanted by a large part of 
the population, unregulated exploitation of child and peasant laborers, and tremendous 
tensions between haves and have-nots.112 The country started to progress by 
implementing government institutions and was able to generate more revenue, but the 
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disparity between the rich and poor and the same liberal–conservative fray would come 
to haunt Colombia. 
The government was able to get the U.S. to contribute more capital towards their 
infrastructure and start developing Colombia as a major state actor in the region. This 
continued through the early 1900s and is believed by some to have started the 
dependency of Colombia to the U.S. More importantly, U.S. influence and political 
control became more prevalent in Colombia. As a case in point, during World War II, 
Colombia at first stayed neutral and was at times even defiant on choosing a side, but 
quickly found itself in border and territory disputes with Venezuela and Peru and was 
rewarded by a generous $8,000,000 “lend-lease aid” package after agreeing to support the 
U.S.113 
None of the political moves that Colombia accomplished during the early 1900s 
to the late 1940s addressed the underlying conflicts between the different social classes 
and political parties. In 1946, workers started to protest and mobilize because of unfair 
wages and government actions. As the groups started growing and spreading, Colombia 
responded with excessive security force that resulted in an estimated 14,000 protestors 
killed during this period. There were some nonviolent movements in the major cities, but 
for the most part, violent uprisings spread throughout the countryside and thousands of 
workers met with death squads sent by the conservative government to set an example. 
The protestors demolished and destroyed anything in sight, regardless of the social 
composition of the city, and the response of the government was inhumane, to say the 
least. People were brutally murdered and the security forces hired armed thugs who put 
trophies consisting of mutilated bodies and body parts like tongues and testicles on 
display in the villages. Besides this ruthless killing, rape and torture were common 
among the security forces.114 Simply put, it was appalling how the Colombian forces 
responded to protests and opposition, and cruelty was how they treated their citizens. 
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This period of Colombian history was known as La Violencia, the era of violence, 
and resulted in over 200,000 people losing their lives. Death squads, torture, and 
unabated violence ravaged the nation, and neither the conservatives nor liberals could 
escape the reality that both parties were responsible. Democracy and political parties 
failed. Communist ideals and support spread throughout the country; in particular, the 
poor rural areas accepted and supported new guerilla fighters from local regions. Even 
with the creation of the National Front, which was intended to end the violence and unite 
the liberal and conservative parties, communism and Marxist ideals appealed to many 
and ignited insurgent groups against the state.115 
Colombia excluded the poor from a voice in their government, used sadistic, 
heavy-handed tactics to end opposition and protests, and was unable to show the people 
that their political system worked. The door opened for communist ideals and ways to 
spread, and the FARC was ready to show a vulnerable population that revolution was the 
answer to their prayers. 
B. INSURGENCY 
It is too simplistic to state that the FARC was established because of new Marxist 
and communist ideals—in fact some argue that these same principles had deep roots 
already embedded among the people. James Brittain in Revolutionary Social Change in 
Colombia argues that communist ideas started in the early 1900s, when peasants 
mobilized with communist groups in the central mountain areas. Linkages between the 
different groups strengthened the argument that “rural inroads” made this mobilization 
possible even before the formation of the PCC (Partido Communista Colombiano—the 
Colombian Communist Party), which can explain the composition of the PCC: peasants 
made up 40% of the total communist group by 1958.116 This was an important element of 
the insurgency—they were mostly poor, already had ideals and teachings from earlier 
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generations, and had violent methods and massive payback mentalities from the civil war. 
These factors were key in the formation of the FARC. 
The National Front was designed to eliminate the liberal–conservative division 
that had led to so much bloodshed, but during this period (the 1950s to early 1960s), it 
was also systematically eliminating the voice of the PCC, who had started to connect 
rural and urban workers in a threat to the state.117 Furthermore, urban capitalists 
monopolized land rights and ownership, which hit the middle and low-level farmer’s 
pocketbook.118 These sometimes forgotten causes explain the events leading up to the 
FARC and provide warning for other nations: ensure that capitalistic gains do not hurt 
large minority groups, especially the poor, who will either give their support or join the 
alternative. 
The FARC was established on May 27, 1964, and had an operating ideology and a 
springboard for action: Marxist communist ideals that claimed to represent the forgotten 
poor against the government of Colombia. The FARC’s early leaders and founders were 
Luis Morantes (aka Jacobo Arenas) and Manual Marulundo Valez (aka Tirofijo).119 The 
FARC moved quickly and established control of an area in the Marquetalia region of 
Tolima. The group insisted that the government allow them to control, operate, and 
provide security for local rural farmers without government intervention. These areas, 
with the encouragement of the PCC and the FARC, started to influence farmers and small 
landowners to share land and create a self-sustaining infrastructure that would allow 
autonomy from the government and, most worrisome to the state, produce “self-defense 
groups.”120 This movement directly threatened the credibility and power of the state, and 
especially their security forces. With much U.S. support, and roughly $17,000,000, along 
with a third of Colombian forces, the government attempted to remove the groups and 
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take back Marquetalia.121 Most of the FARC was defeated, but senior leadership escaped 
and the operation was not considered a total victory, since some defense groups stayed in 
power and controlled small areas in the region.122 The group now had their legitimacy—
they had brought their struggles to the world stage and forced the Colombian government 
to spend millions and use thousands of troops without defeating them. 
The FARC continued to build momentum and support in the late 1970s and 
1980s, with only a few attacks and minor incidents with the government (as compared to 
the 1990s), since they remained mostly in rural areas. At one point, they even came to a 
peace agreement with the government of Colombia, known as the Union Patriotica (UP), 
which turned the organization into more of a political movement vice a guerilla group. 
This ended quickly with the assassinations of many of their political figures, which made 
the group turn their center of attention back to violent measures and focus on urban 
targets as well. They started targeting all Colombian military and government officials, 
along with any American citizens or businesses. Their methods included murder, torture, 
intimidation, bombings, and extortions against anyone who opposed them, including the 
innocent. The group grew to 18,000 members and major attacks increased throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s.123 The FARC formed because of weak government institutions 
and, to their credit, tried political methods under the formation of the UP, but realized 
that their voice and representation would only be heard through violent acts. 
Drug trafficking and brutal, indiscriminate killings increased, and the FARC was 
one of the major reasons for this problem. Paramilitaries, weak Colombian security 
forces, and numerous other terrorist or drug-trafficking cells made Colombia a bistro of 
terror. Citizens were gunned down or forced to evacuate cities, and there were even 
accusations of Colombian military forces working with paramilitaries to kill and silence 
the people. In other words, Colombia was a complete disaster with numerous players: 
drug traffickers, paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and the FARC, among others, 
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all working against stability. Over 300 guerilla cells moved into Bogota’s poor areas and 
spread influence and gained intelligence—they eventually controlled almost 40 per cent 
of these areas. To assert control, they operated like a gang, killing and intimidating 
whoever worked with security forces and coercing individuals to join their movement.124 
As in Turkey, the government allowed the poor areas to be controlled by the wrong 
groups, and even more crucially, lacked the security forces needed to maintain order. It 
was complete chaos, and the people of Colombia ultimately paid the price, forced to 
choose between terrorist groups, paramilitaries, or corrupt security forces for their basic 
security requirements. 
A successful move by the FARC, and an instructive lesson on what not to do, was 
to convince the government to give up territory during negotiations. Due to the warlike 
climate in Colombia and weak state institutions, the government opted to try something 
different. President Andres Pastrana bargained with the FARC for a ceasefire and gave up 
territory the size of Switzerland. The FARC thus not only had government-granted land, 
they now had a staging and training area for more drug-trafficking operations and guerilla 
fighters. The FARC continued their attacks and eventually lost the territory, but 
nonetheless had showed the population once again that they were a creditable, legitimate 
group that could take down the government.125 
Sometimes forgotten during insurgencies is that excessive means against 
insurgents and the regular population by COIN forces results in increased violence. 
Saying that Colombian forces were guilty of this method would be an understatement. 
Colombian forces were not legally responsible for human-rights violations and were 
immune from prosecution. Furthermore, as noted by Jaskoski, the military forces only 
accepted policing and narcotics missions to receive more funding for COIN missions, 
especially better equipment like armed helicopters and small, fast boats for river 
operations.126 These COIN expenditures were misguided, because the military did not 
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focus on local areas that supported the FARC and drug trade. This strengthened the 
insurgency, which were able to continue operating in areas where the security forces did 
not care to go. 
Because of weak government institutions, the FARC was able to prey on rural 
communities and take away the choice they should have had—that is, to join and support 
the insurgency or work with the government. The latter was not even an option, since the 
security forces and paramilitaries were corrupt and at times just as violent as the FARC. 
Giving the FARC legitimate territory in which to act autonomously, also showed the 
people that they were in a sense winning, because the government had been made to 
negotiate. One could see, with the country in chaos, that the people were not sure who 
was winning—the drug dealers, the paramilitaries, the FARC, or the government. 
Regardless of these choices, the FARC combined rural and urban groups to mobilize 
against the government, and the FARC was winning. 
C. COIN AND MILITARY ADAPTATION 
Colombian security forces needed a complete overhaul, and by and large, 
government functioning needed to improve as well; the way this is usually accomplished 
is by a charismatic leader at the top, usually the president, and senior military officials 
who have the same agenda and goal as their civilian leadership. This was not present in 
the Pastrana (1998–2002) administration and truly diminished any momentum that the 
military was able to build. The soldiers were being tasked to crush the insurgency while 
the administration was negotiating with their opponents at the same time. The soldiers 
were forced to accept policies that damaged the army’s ability and strategic plans to carry 
out what was needed to destroy the FARC and handle other security disputes.127, 128 
President Alvaro Uribe’s (2002–2010) policy and strategy were different; he 
worked with the military understanding that “military reform was central” for success, 
and even though it started under the Pastrana era, it was not fully utilized until the 
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civilian leadership managed their security forces correctly. The military quickly sprang to 
action, accepting that their major failures in the 1980s and 1990s were due to lack of 
professionalism—specifically, the lack of a major platform to train and equip best 
practices. The military-education system needed to be revamped, especially in the NCO 
core and in training more volunteers vice large conscript forces.129 Obviously, all 
military forces conduct some sort of training program, regardless of size or funding; the 
key is to perform this function correctly and appropriately. Sending eighteen-year-olds 
into villages during an insurgency without proper training usually yields not-so-desirable 
results. 
The training role of the military forces started to improve, and now they needed 
an answer to the “equip” failures of their forces. As expected, funding was the main 
contributor to this part of the mission. Monetary allowances cannot win wars, but does 
provide the hardware that forces need to fight; the challenging part is being able to put 
the correct equipment in the hands of a properly trained force. 
“Plan Colombia,” with its $1.3 billion pledge from the U.S., was a large part of 
the reason Colombian forces were able to fill their equip shortages.130 The objectives 
focused on counter-drug issues and the instability caused by paramilitaries and the 
FARC.131 Even though the U.S. allocated the money for mostly counter-narcotic (CN) 
missions, the Colombian forces knew that counterterrorism (CT) missions, going directly 
after the FARC and others, would allow the forces to take back lost areas and influence 
more of the population. Over 400 military and civilian assets under the military-
assistance mission (U.S. Military Group [MILGP]) with U.S. state-department support 
helped train Colombian forces to battle their insurgency. The U.S. felt that if the 
Colombian forces triumphed in the narcotics fray, then violence and terrorist groups 
would lose funding and die. Colombian forces did not agree with this logic, but after 
9/11, the CN and CT barriers were blurred and sort of lumped into one mission. 
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Regardless, the result was more funding, and 145,000 men with 20,000 volunteer 
counter-guerilla forces in mobile, local units were able to benefit from the surge due to 
improved professional training and newly funded equipment.132 
The COIN objectives could now be realistic and have the restraint element that 
comes from proper training. New combat equipment with technology purchases of 
helicopters and small boats could be used correctly. Colombian forces understood that the 
“domination of local areas was the lynchpin” for success during their COIN efforts.133 
The military used conscripts to patrol and secure large areas, while the volunteer, more 
professional units would strike local internal targets and manage the regular core 
soldiers.134 The objectives could be truly successful only because the policy given by the 
civilian leadership supported the same goal. President Uribe, with support from the 
highly decorated General Carlos Ospina, established a national plan that focused solely 
on the population. Coordination from the police and army was improved and gave both 
forces better directives, with new laws that empowered the security forces; but without 
question, the plan was to protect the citizens of Colombia. “The people” and the 
“population” were repeated over and over throughout the document, which was the 
guiding framework for speeches given by all military and civilian leaders.135 Colombian 
forces now had established appropriate train-and-equip best practices with a unified 
agenda from civilian and military leadership. 
Insurgencies drain resources—human and capital. Colombian forces experienced 
this firsthand throughout their 50-year battle with the FARC and other paramilitary and 
insurgent groups. Funding was running out from Plan Colombia when the administration 
imposed a one-time war tax that allowed $670 million dollars to be used for the Plan de 
Choque during 2002–2006.136 The money was designed to mobilize and support smaller 
local units. It transferred conscript slots to much more costly (roughly ten times more 
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expensive) volunteer positions at the rate of 10,000 per year. Local forces were now 
established, and the military, with help from the government, used an old 1940 law that 
allowed drafted soldiers to serve in their hometowns.137 They were known as “home 
guards” or soldadosde mi pueblo in Spanish; this was a great example of proper train-
and-equip procedures. The forces were composed of forty-man units (approximately) in 
over 600 locations. The teams were led by professional officers and senior NCOs who 
were not volunteers. This provided key intelligence for the security forces and improved 
coordinated joint efforts with local police and the army.138 Colombian forces focused on 
organizing, training, equipping, and understanding local small-town dynamics, which 
greatly improved security and overall government legitimacy throughout the country. The 
people now had a creditable choice and a different option from just the FARC—a stable, 
reliable state. 
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Colombia offers an extraordinary example of military adaptation through 
military–civil relations. It was not easy, and at times it seemed the government was going 
to completely lose control and legitimacy. Funding and proper train-and-equip 
procedures turned the tide on the insurgency and made the FARC scramble and overreact 
violently to exist. Studying their methods closely provides some key lessons for future 
conflicts. 
1. Civil–military Relations Need Coordinated Leadership throughout 
the Insurgency 
This might sound like an obvious lesson, but as Pastrana showed, if the military 
and civilian leadership are not on the same page of music, the result is much worse than 
horrid sounds. Leadership is key and must come from the president or highest civilian 
leader of a nation, with the senior military leaders working together to match policy with 
strategy. Uribe and Ospina were able to work together and lead their forces to success. 
Institutionalizing and allowing accountability measures were a must between these two 
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entities, because the goal was not only to kill insurgents, but to win over the people.139 
The top leadership must not lose sight on the population, as Uribe and his senior military 
officers’ success illustrates. 
2. Policy from Civilian Leadership Must Focus on the Population 
Many times the focus on killing and battling insurgents trumps the main reason 
for COIN efforts, that is the populace—and even civilian supporters and active 
participants should be given the opportunity and ability to work with their state. Strong 
leadership in civil-military relations during insurgencies is needed. 
3. Governments Should Not Negotiate or Give Up Territory to 
Insurgents 
This might seem to some as a possible peace measure that could end violence 
with the insurgents, but as the Colombian case proved, it did not end the insurgency and 
in fact strengthened its actions by giving the FARC legitimacy and territory to train 
forces in. It was also a perceived weakness of the government, since they had to 
negotiate. 
4. COIN Conflicts Are Extremely Expensive—Use Funds Accordingly 
This success was mostly possible because of Plan Colombia and the government 
tax efforts to increase security forces. Not all nations are afforded this luxury, but in the 
case of Colombia, the funds were used correctly. The focus was to spend more revenue 
on professional training for all the security forces and select and train volunteer soldiers 
at a more professional level. The equipping mission was important, but more important 
was training in the Colombian case, because the military already had large quantities of 
equipment and material resources. 
5. Professional Training and Schools for Officers and NCOs Are a Must 
Most nations have a difficult time with this mission. Unlike the U.S., like 
Colombia did and others continue to face challenges in their ability or resources to 
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properly train security forces. The human-rights violations were mostly caused by this 
problem, as improperly trained soldiers were thrown into small communities and simply 
ordered to fight. Escalation of force measures was introduced and better overall training 
pipelines for security forces were used. The lesson: employ professional forces to lead 
and manage draftees. 
6. A Small Local Unit Embedded within the Population is Crucial to 
Defeating an Insurgency 
The most important element in COIN, after training and equipping a force, is this 
strategy. Too many times, COIN forces enjoy the comforts that big bases and guarded 
compounds provide. But what happens when security forces go back to their bases? The 
insurgents move back in and are able to operate freely. Colombian military–civil 
leadership came up with a brilliant plan—use professional soldiers to work with local 
draftees and keep them in their villages or small towns. These small units were extremely 
successful, providing much intelligence and allowing better coordination with local 
police forces.140 
7. The Government Cannot Forget Poor and Rural Areas, Because They 
Are, and Always Will Be, an Insurgency Breeding Ground 
Small units were able to work in the rural areas and show the poor that they were 
not forgotten, and the government, through its newly trained and equipped security 
forces, was able to push out insurgents and maintain order in the villages. 
Colombian security forces were able to achieve success because they had proper 
COIN objectives, mixed with a strong working relationship between civilian and military 
leadership. Most of the success can be attributed to top-down adaptation among senior 
civil–military leadership. That connection, coupled with funding increases, promoted a 
more unified effort that focused on the appropriate training and equipping of forces. The 
history of Colombia highlights the importance for all nations of truly understanding and 
examining what sets off deep-rooted problems that carry over from older generations. 
These problems usually come from the forgotten, poor classes of society. This research 
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does not examine external factors that supported the insurgency. More research and data 
points could provide a better understanding on how the FARC was able to use the drug-
trafficking trade with neighbors and how that affected the insurgency. Meanwhile, this 
case study highlights the importance of acknowledging past mistakes and ensuring that 
military and civilian leadership work in coordination to guide the operations undertaken 




Excellence is an art won by training and habituation. We do not act rightly 
because we have virtue or excellence, but we rather have those because we 
have acted rightly. We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not 
an act but a habit.141 
—Aristotle 
This thesis addresses the basic question of how to train and equip forces to 
counter an insurgency and why train-and-equip matters in a COIN environment. As the 
three case studies demonstrate, COIN is a very challenging and dynamic mission that 
requires much preparation and flexibility to produce positive results. These results will 
always vary. Regardless of region or history, insurgencies are lengthy conflicts that test 
the will of military forces and insurgents alike. As Aristotle points out, training is hard 
work in the quest to do the right thing, but the practices of most militaries result in 
repetitive failure, regardless of good intentions. The excellence that Aristotle describes 
has to come from within a COIN effort, from a focus on the population coupled with a 
military that is building and training a self-sustaining force by realistic means. 
Why is this mission so difficult? To tackle this question, this thesis made 
reference to the old-school insurgent theorists Taber and Mao for a better understanding 
of the insurgent mindset. History has proven time and time again that battles are often 
fought without truly understanding what the other belligerents are fighting for. Insight 
from scholarly research by Jaskoski and Russell sets the stage for questions such as 
whether a given military is over tasked during COIN missions. Is it driven by monetary 
compensation, and is adaptation a crucial element in operational success? With these 
strong lines of inquiry, this thesis also attempted to show that regardless of the causes of 
an insurgency, once it is active, train-and-equip best practices are effective in lowering 
insurgent activity.142 
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The following hypotheses from this thesis emphasized the importance of train-
and-equip efforts. First, regardless of culture or geography, nations do not focus on train-
and-equip policies to fight insurgencies; instead, a military focuses on large, conventional 
military forces, with monetary backing. Second, the intensity of an insurgency depends 
on what cultural differences sparked the fight and whether the host nation has outside 
forces supporting COIN efforts. Third, when a COIN mission focuses on the process of 
training and equipping (more so in the training mission), whether by accident or plan, the 
insurgency decreases—regardless of any increase in monetary expenditures to forces. 
A. FINDINGS 
One could argue that all militaries, in one form or another, train and equip their 
forces to conduct operations. That is true—but this thesis argues that the focus must not 
be on kinetic means primarily, but more on establishing a local force that can carry out 
the mission, either by the security forces or with a more desirable effort from local 
participation. Table 1 is a graphic representation from the three case studies highlighting 
their similarities regardless of reason for the insurgency. This chart would vary 
throughout the insurgency due to when the nation actually adapted or implemented the 
policies, but nonetheless it captures the similarities between the three nations, and 
confirms they achieved success when they focused on train and equip best practices. 
 








Afghanistan X X X X External 
Turkey X X X X Ethnic 
Colombia X X X X Social 
Table 1.   Train and Equip Friction Points.143 
The major findings from this thesis are, 
1. Form local, small teams. As all three case studies proved, this is a crucial 
part of the training mission. In Afghanistan, it was much easier for a small 
team of three to five service members to travel to Afghan locations and 
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train forces at their compounds.144 In Colombia, the security forces were 
able to create local, small units with professional officers that worked with 
local conscripts to regain support from the populace and push the 
insurgents out.145 In Turkey, the “mobile striker units” gained ground by 
living in the heart of the major cities.146 The people must see the COIN 
efforts in their villages, and the insurgents lose ground and traction when 
forces leave their gated and secure compounds to actually perform COIN. 
2. Focus on the people. All three cases highlighted the importance of not 
forgetting the poor and displaced. The people are the prize. Insurgents and 
COIN forces will always push and pull objectives to win over the 
populace. All operations in any insurgency must have the populace in 
mind, and at times, more risk and restraint must be accepted to achieve 
this success.147 
3. Use a professional military. In the Afghan case, ISAF was a capable 
force led by mostly U.S. forces. Those forces were professionally trained 
and equipped to conduct kinetic missions, but as the author stressed, 
adaptation was crucial for success. As for Turkey, and especially 
Colombia, once the training aspect was professionalized, the security 
forces were able to gain momentum because they had the proper training 
and equipment that contributed to better success. 
4. Make policing a priority. Forces are needed to conduct policing 
missions. Once local units are established, a professional police force is 
needed to keep out insurgents and protect the population. All three cases 
examined made this a priority at different times, but as highlighted by 
each chapter, successful gains were achieved once it was realized. This is 
usually a late focus by COIN forces or a secondary priority that receives 
little capital in terms of finances or qualified personnel. The police live 
and breathe with the people and must be able to instill trust and keep out 
insurgents. 
Other findings by examination of the three proposed hypotheses, to challenge 
some preconceived notions that some, including the author, had about insurgencies are as 
follows: 
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1. Hypothesis 1: A Large Force with a Substantial Budget Is Key 
Without question, militaries need large forces with a supporting budget to conduct 
operations. The weakness in relying on this precept comes from the undisputed facts. The 
Soviets had a large conventional force that out-equipped the Afghans and exceeded their 
technology by centuries. The U.S. committed over 60,000 U.S. troops by 2011 and 
invested billions, which turned to a trillion, towards the mission in Afghanistan.148 And 
Plan Colombia’s $1.3 billion went to good use in terms of equipping their military 
forces.149 Nevertheless, the insurgencies continued and were not defeated. Money and 
heavily equipped forces do very little to insurgencies in terms of winning over the 
populace. 
2. Hypothesis 2: Cultural Differences and External Factors Matter 
The three case studies had divergent causes. Afghanistan is the most diverse 
country, with many tribal and ethnic differences, but its insurgency came from deep-
rooted, unresolved foreign intervention that created many conflicts over the past thirty 
years. Colombia’s insurgency had some aspects of cultural differences, but was more a 
struggle between social classes. The Turkish insurgency involved ethnic differences 
between Kurds and Turks.150 The author contends that all three insurgencies continued 
regardless of culture differences and external support. That is not to say that culture and 
external support do not affect insurgencies, but they are not as important as the train-and-
equip mission. Seth Jones argues that external support to insurgencies studied over the 
past 50 years yielded a 50% success rate over time, whereas those with no external 
support won only 17% of the time. External factors can at times tip the balance of 
operations, but, as Jones continues, they are not the deciding factor in victory, because 
these players do not reside or live in the area they are fighting in.151 Cutting off external 
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support to insurgencies is extremely helpful, as Turkey did in Iraq, but it is not the 
deciding factor in insurgent conflict. 
3. Hypothesis 3: Focus on Train-and-equip Objectives, Especially 
Training, Will Decrease Insurgency Activities 
Not perfect, but the best hypotheses of the three. The research from this thesis 
showed that there was very little data on the equipping end as being a major contributor 
to success or decrease in insurgent activity. Afghanistan in the past twelve years has 
increased its security forces to over 300,000 troops trained by ISAF, including army and 
police, added ample weapons and body armor to their forces, and even upgraded to 
armored security vehicles in some regions.152 Continued green-on-blue attacks (Afghan 
security forces turning on trainers) and ISAF’s reduction in forces by 2014 will test the 
training of these forces, who are now heavily equipped. Turkey has a force of over 
400,000 soldiers and is equipped with several divisions and battalions of armored 
vehicles and air assets.153 Colombia now has over 270,000 soldiers, heavy mobile 
brigades, and scores of heavy equipment assets and machine guns.154 Afghanistan, 
Turkey, and Colombia’s military equipment is unmatched by their insurgent enemies; 
more research could track the progression of those increases as they relate to their 
insurgencies. Without question, security forces need funding to purchase equipment to 
fight insurgents. But as history has proven, technology can only do so much in an 
irregular conflict. This thesis argues that the countries studied had real success only when 
training-and-equipping objectives focused on local objectives, the people, and relied 
more on professional training of local forces. 
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B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Examining how countries train and equip forces to battle an insurgency, through 
the examples of Afghanistan, Turkey, and Colombia, has produced some implications for 
future COIN strategies and objectives. These findings and the major points, which 
focused on local, mobile forces, the populace, a professional military, and concentration 
on policing, contribute to the major implications of this research. 
First, the goal in a COIN environment should be to establish a self-sustaining 
force. The findings from this research demonstrate the challenges that all three countries 
had when dealing with their insurgencies. Funding, proper equipment, and even allied 
support is needed, but cannot replace a training mission that will create a force to 
continue the fight once supplemental funding and support decreases. Even more 
important, a self-sustaining force can prevent other insurgencies and contain current 
conflicts. The past ninety insurgencies lasted an average of fourteen years.155 What that 
means is that insurgencies will usually outlast popular support (by those for or against the 
conflict), funding requirements, and physical support in terms of boots on the ground. All 
three countries examined had U.S. involvement in policy and state support, but mostly 
received substantial financial support. The billions of aid that the U.S. has allocated for 
insurgencies will unquestionably decline as the 21
st
 century continues. Whether created 
directly from outside support, as in the role of the U.S. in Afghanistan, or from 
institutions and resources found within national borders, the findings in this research 
affirm the importance of a self-sustaining force. 
Finally, military adaptation and innovation must be encouraged and examined at 
all levels. Insurgencies are so irregular that strategies and training objectives from WWII 
are unlikely to be the correct starting point—even at the beginning of a conflict. As the 
case studies showed, a large number of offensive tools, in the form of equipment and 
forces, sometimes make things worse. Beyond the scope of this thesis was how politics 
and state decisions shape the ability of war fighters to accomplish their mission. Most 
experts would agree that the Iraqi conflict in 2003 affected the mission in Afghanistan, 
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due to resource management and support from the home front. The same types of issues 
most likely affected Turkey and Colombia as well. The strategies devised by civilian 
leaders, or senior military leaders, depending on the country, must not constrain the 
forces on the ground from changing tactics while still supporting objectives. The Afghan 
case study showed how innovation and adaptation increased success and provided the 
only real way the mission could be completed. The objective stayed the same—to train 
Afghans—but the “how” was massaged to yield better results, from the bottom up. The 
Colombian case study showed how top-down reform improved military performance 
during the insurgency. As for Turkey, it too experienced adaptation and innovation by 
changing its kinetic methods to counter the PKK. Whether in peacetime or combat, 
adaptation and innovation must be promoted at all levels and at all times. Some argue that 
changes won’t happen if a force is winning, or thinks it is winning, and will only occur 
when failure is shown on the battlefield. Russell argues that in peacetime, changes 
usually come from senior civilian and military leaders; in wartime, the military will 
continue to reach objectives by adaptation and innovation in real time and “produce 
outputs relevant to their environment.”156 The author agrees with this assessment and 
moreover has lived it. 
It is important to understand why a given insurgency has erupted. This thesis 
sought to define what actions work best when an insurgency is already present. The train-
and-equip mission is usually an afterthought, once military forces have killed, or think 
they have killed, most of the insurgents. Proper military and civilian partnership can 
guide strategies that meet the objective of ending the insurgency. Until world militaries 
truly focus on winning insurgency conflicts by training and equipping forces at the local 
level, there will be continued failures and many lives lost on all sides. Insurgencies will 
never go away; but steadfast train-and-equip best practices can give security forces the 
means to fight insurgents and create a self-sustaining force that can improve security 
conditions for the civilian population. 
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